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Abstract
This article examines the narrative demands placed on 
asylum seekers to the United States. Engaging with scholars 
from the fields of narratology and literature, this article 
argues that “telling a story” is an implicit requirement of the 
asylum application process to the United States, and that the 
stories of asylum seekers are evaluated for their truthfulness 
on the basis of criteria that align with literary standards of 
veracity. The article examines the implications of bringing 
these literary standards of veracity to bear on asylum seek-
ers’ stories, and explores the ways in which a “true” story 
told by an asylum seeker may fail to be recognized as such.
Résumé
Cet article examine les exposés des faits exigés des deman-
deurs d’asile aux États-Unis. Fondé sur la participation 
d’universitaires des domaines de la narratologie et de la 
littérature, cet article soutient que la « narration d’une 
histoire » constitue une exigence implicite du processus de 
demande d’asile aux États-Unis, et que les histoires des 
demandeurs d’asile sont évaluées d’après leur véracité sur la 
base de critères conformes aux normes de véracité utilisées 
dans le domaine littéraire. Il examine les conséquences de 
l’application de normes littéraires de véracité à des histoires 
de demandeurs d’asile, et explore les différents cas de figure 
dans lesquels l’histoire « vraie » rapportée par un deman-
deur d’asile peut ne pas être reconnue comme telle.
I will relate thee a story that shall,
if it be the will of God,
be the means of procuring deliverance.
—Scheherazade, The Thousand and One Nights
To call a story a true story is an insult to both art and truth.
—Vladimir Nabokov
Introduction
I became interested in the application process for politi-cal asylum in the United States during several months I spent working for a refugee resettlement agency. Many 
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asylum seekers described the process of applying as the hard-
est experience of their lives, and yet also usually described 
the process by saying, “I had to tell them my story.” I became 
interested in this seeming contradiction; to tell one’s story—
why should that constitute the hardest experience of one’s 
life? There is a suggestion in the phrase “tell your story” that 
the asylum application is an opportunity for self-expression; 
training materials for asylum officers stress the importance 
of allowing applicants to use “his or her own words” to make 
the claim in as “unrestricted” a manner as possible.1 But 
these belie the fact that not just any telling of one’s story will 
do. The focus of my research is the application process for 
political asylum in the United States and the unique narra-
tive demands it places upon applicants.
Those who have written most extensively on the process of 
applying for asylum have been lawyers and anthropologists, 
and I have drawn thoroughly on their findings. This article 
has drawn especially on the work of folklorist Amy Schu-
man and attorney Carol Bohmer, and anthropologist Marita 
Eastmond, who have written on the profound disconnects 
in understanding between American bureaucracies and the 
people who must navigate them. However, in contrast to 
these approaches, this study engages closely with the defin-
ing characteristics of narrative and of credibility in narrative, 
and draws on the work of scholars including Elaine Scarry 
and others in the field of law and literature to theorize about 
the tacit literary standards to which we hold asylum appli-
cants accountable. This article argues that, rather than a col-
loquial approximation of what is required of asylum seekers, 
“telling a story” is an implicit requirement of the application 
process for political asylum in the United States. I argue that 
Western literary standards shape our understanding of what 
a “true story” should sound like; this conflation of literary 
story-telling and truthful story-telling in the context of asy-
lum proceedings can result in the failure to recognize “true” 
stories told by asylum seekers. 
Stories for Asylum
Today applicants for political asylum must fill out the I-589 
Application for Asylum, distributed by the United States Citi-
zenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), a division of the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS).2 The instructions 
attached to the I-589 explicitly direct applicants that all infor-
mation provided must be true: “All statements in response 
to questions contained in this application are declared to be 
true and correct under penalty of perjury.”3 Beyond this, the 
instructions require that an applicant must “establish that race, 
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, 
or political opinion was or will be at least one central reason for 
your persecution or why you fear persecution.”4 The instruc-
tions also state, “You are strongly urged to attach additional 
written statements … that support your claim. Your written 
statements should include events, dates, and details of your 
experiences that relate to your claim for asylum.”5
The I-589 form itself first solicits biographical informa-
tion in fill-in-the-blank boxes, before soliciting information 
about the applicant’s arrival in the United States. Then, above 
a larger box, it asks:
A. Have you, your family, or close friends or colleagues ever experi-
enced harm or mistreatment or threats in the past by anyone? If 
“Yes,” explain in detail:
1. What happened;
2. When the harm or mistreatment or threats occurred;
3. Who caused the harm or mistreatment or threats; and
4. Why you believe the harm or mistreatment or threats oc-
curred.
B. Do you fear harm or mistreatment if you return to your home 
country? If “Yes,” explain in detail:
1. What harm or mistreatment you fear;
2. Who you believe would harm or mistreat you; and
3. Why you believe you would or could be harmed or 
mistreated.6
After filling out this form and its attachments, applicants 
must appear before an asylum officer or immigration judge 
to testify to the contents. Persuasive completion of this form, 
and repetition of its contents to an asylum officer or immi-
gration judge: for asylum seekers today, this is the key that 
unlocks a new life, or fails to.7 
It is clear upon first glance that this is a linguistic key: 
only through constructing something out of language can an 
applicant gain entrance. But just what kind of linguistic con-
struction is it? Though official materials do not use the word 
story, in advocacy materials and in conversation amongst 
applicants, lawyers, or asylum officers, it is common enough 
to explain the application process for asylum as an impera-
tive or an opportunity for the applicant to “tell her story.” 
What is a story? How is it different from a list, a poem, a cry 
for help? While there is no singular consensus on the formal 
elements of a story, and it is still common to debate whether 
particular texts qualify or not, narratologists, from Aristotle 
to Roland Barthes to David Herman, have identified certain 
standard elements.8
Four characteristics reoccur in narratologists’ appraisals 
of the necessary components of stories: (1) Stories are par-
ticular; they are built around particular entities and events, 
as opposed to abstract trends or general explanations. (2) 
Stories take place in time, recording the movements of a 
particular being or beings, which we call a character or 
characters. (3) Stories create a link between one event and 
the next; they have a “plot.” The earliest student of narrative, 
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Aristotle, explains that “of all plots … the episodic are the 
worst … in which the episodes or acts succeed one another 
without probable or necessary sequence.”9 In other words, 
stories should have clear sequences, the beginning giving 
rise to the middle, and the middle in turn leading inexorably 
to the end. (4) Finally, though this criterion is slightly more 
flexible, most stories contain the internal, subjective compo-
nent of human or human-like perceptions, of whatever or 
whoever is the focus of the story, as well as description of 
the outer world. They do not only link one event to the next, 
but can create a link between the inner world of characters 
and the outer world of events. Incorporating internal experi-
ences of characters, stories offer a sense of, as Herman puts 
it, “what’s it like to live through … disruption.”10 By creating 
“a nexus or link between the experiencing self and the world 
experienced,” stories give a sense of how characters respond 
to or influence the world beyond themselves.11 
The I-589 form asks applicants to describe experiences, to 
place those experiences in time, to give name to the persons 
involved, as well as assign motives to those persons. In other 
words, applicants are asked to create detailed cause-and-
effect accounts of their lives’ most disruptive experiences 
and integrate their internal, felt experience insofar as “fear” 
is concerned. These elements—(1) particularity, (2) move-
ment through time, (3) causality or plot, and (4) felt human 
experience—are precisely the defining characteristics of sto-
ries. “Tell your story” is not just a colloquial approximation 
of what is asked of applicants in the asylum process—rather, 
it is an implicit requirement. 
How to Tell a True Story: Detailed, Plausible, 
Consistent
The I-589 application demands stories; the written narrative 
of an applicant’s experiences, usually attached to the form 
in an affidavit or declaration, is the “central evidence” in her 
case.12 There are two important caveats about stories in a 
legal context that differentiate them from the literary context. 
First, in law, storytelling functions as an argument. Second, 
the consequences of legal storytelling are inherently concrete. 
Stories told in a legal setting may follow some of conven-
tions of stories told elsewhere but are subject to additional 
pressures and expectations. Paul Gewirtz, a scholar of law 
and literature, clarifies that “virtually everyone in the legal 
culture … is explicitly or implicitly making an argument and 
trying to persuade. Storytelling is, or is made to function as, 
argument. The goal of telling stories in law is not to entertain, 
or to terrify, or to illuminate life, as it usually is with story-
telling outside the legal culture. The goal of storytelling in 
law is to persuade an official decision-maker that one’s story 
is true, to win the case, and thus to invoke the coercive force 
of the state on one’s behalf.”13
What Gewirtz calls “the coercive force of the state,” in 
the case of the asylum seeker, will be enacted to ensure her 
protection in the United States, or to order her removal and 
return to country she has fled. 
This disproportion between the apparent insubstantiality 
of a story and the enormity of the decision based upon it 
is powerfully evoked by Scheherazade from the well-known 
medieval tale that frames The Thousand and One Nights. The 
text’s King Shariyar, an unhappy ruler with an insatiable 
appetite for power and women, sleeps with a virgin each 
night and slays her in the morning. When Scheherazade is 
called forth for her fateful turn with the king, she devises a 
plan to save her life. Each night, she recites to him a story; 
as long as he is caught up in her tale, Shariyar spares Sche-
herazade’s life for one more day. Scheherazade intuits that 
stories can be used to direct the “coercive force of the state”; 
asylum seekers, too, must tell stories to such an end. In an 
interview a U.S. asylum officer commented on what high-
stakes storytelling means in the asylum context: “My super-
visor said, ‘How are you going to feel if [the applicant] goes 
back and [someone] puts a bullet in his head?’ And I said, 
‘I’m gonna feel terrible about it, obviously.’ But I have to make 
a decision and I have to live with it. That’s what this job is 
about. You make a decision about people’s lives.”14 Decisions 
based upon stories alter the lives of the tellers. In the case of 
both Scheherazade and asylum seekers, it may quite literally 
be the difference between life and death. 
Given the critical role of an applicant’s story, there is a 
peculiar absence of official advice on how to provide it. The 
I-589 offers little formal instruction beyond the reminder that 
an applicant must prove his persecution was on the basis of 
one or more of the five protected grounds, and a strong urg-
ing to include “events, dates, and details of your experiences 
that relate to your claim for asylum.”15 The text recorded on 
the form, or attached in a written statement, known as a dec-
laration or affidavit, may be any length or style so long as it 
is submitted to USCIS in English.16 In the absence of detailed 
official guidance, advocacy groups and asylum lawyers have 
created a small corpus of advice on how to make this story 
the best, most persuasive piece of evidence.17 
In her discussion of the ideal application story, Stacy 
Caplow, a professor of asylum law and director of the Safe 
Harbor Project, which offers legal representation to asylum 
seekers, stresses that the story must, at the very minimum, 
“meet the legal standard for eligibility and … establish 
credibility.”18 In other words, it is essential that an applicant’s 
story (1) meet the established criteria for the definition of 
refugee and (2) appear to be true. Asylum lawyers agree 
that if an applicant does indeed meet the criteria for refugee 
status, her credibility—her ability to convince the asylum 
officer or immigration judge in writing and in person that 
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what she says is true—is the determining factor of her case. 
Applicants must tell the truth and must tell a story; credibil-
ity is the factor that ostensibly allows them to do both. An 
adverse credibility finding undermines an application and is 
precisely what government officials are trained to listen for. 
As one asylum officer said when interviewed in the docu-
mentary Well-Founded Fear, in many cases “you have to just 
go for them in terms of their credibility, and usually you can 
get them. And I realize that sounds kinda sinister—you gotta 
get ’em—but, that’s what you gotta do. It’s usually not too 
difficult. They’re not too sophisticated.”19 
Interestingly, many legal practitioners and literary critics 
agree in their assessments of what constitutes “truth” in a 
story. These assessments point to requirements that both 
complement and exceed the requirements of stories more 
generally. Caplow claims that for a story to be found credible 
by an asylum officer or an immigration judge, “the facts need 
to be detailed, plausible, and consistent, and the applicant 
must relate them convincingly in writing and orally.”20 In 
this respect, the canons of literature and law align; these same 
criteria—detail, plausibility, and consistency—are acknowl-
edged by theorists to be hallmarks of truth as defined by 
literary standards. 
An effective asylum story, one that is credible, should be 
“detailed.” According to Caplow, in a legal context, details are 
desirable because “detailed testimony seems more truthful,” 
and furthermore, details help to “attract the reader to the 
individuality of [the applicant] and the particularity of his 
story.”21 She is referring to details like times or locations that 
ground a story in the past, but she is also referring to other, 
seemingly less relevant details. Details can help “bring to life” 
the situation described and as a result “produce understand-
ing, sympathy, and compassion” in a reader, she writes.22 
Asylum officers reiterate that detail is necessary to convince 
them an applicant is telling the truth. “They have to give me 
detail,” said one officer. “He could answer my questions. He 
could give me details … if you lived it you can give me the 
answers.”23 Another expressed his skepticism of those who 
did not differentiate their stories through detail. “I don’t 
know, they’re so identical,” he said. “So boilerplate, there’s 
not even anything unique about the claims, it makes you 
wonder.”24 
Echoing Caplow’s and other asylum officer’s comments, 
critic and semiotician Roland Barthes, in his seminal essay, 
“The Reality Effect,” claims that details that are “superfluous” 
to the structure or movement of a narrative, which might 
be discarded as “useless details,” actually do the important 
work of making the narrative seem “real.”25 He explains that 
in antiquity, picturesque or vivid description (hypotyposis) 
was appreciated for its beauty. Its goal was to “put things 
before the hearer’s eyes” in a manner that was aesthetically 
remarkable.26 While aesthetic preference may still be in play, 
he claims that in modern literary realism, inclusion of detail 
is an attempt to create the illusion, in both historical writing 
and fiction, of a “pure encounter between an object and its 
expression,” or of unmediated truth.27 Though literary critic 
and professor James Wood is concerned strictly with fiction, 
he, too, writes about the relationship between details and 
truth by drawing on the medieval concept of haecceitas, or 
“thisness.” A detail with “thisness” is one that “draws abstrac-
tion towards itself and seems to kill that abstraction with a 
puff of palpability, any detail that centres our attention with 
its concretion.”28 A detail with “thisness,” he writes, “seems 
really true.”29
After “detailed,” Caplow’s second criterion is “plausible”: 
could it have happened in the real world? To have certainty 
about the events in question, government officers, ideally, 
would like to see material evidence: certificates, photographs, 
threat notices, injuries, scars. But often, even if there is con-
crete evidence, applicants are not able to gather it before flee-
ing, or it is not conclusive. In the absence of certainty about 
an applicant’s story, adjudicators settle for plausibility, the 
suggestion that what happened is reasonable and probable, 
that it indeed might have happened. Plausibility can be bol-
stered by testimonies from academics or State Department 
reports on human rights conditions in the country from 
which an applicant comes, but largely it falls to the story to 
satisfy. 
Effective use of narrative structure helps an applicant 
satisfy this criterion of plausibility. Aristotle writes that sto-
ries should have “causal necessity,” meaning each event is a 
plausible, or even necessary successor to the previous one.30 
In contrast to an episodic plot, in which no event is logically 
linked to the previous one, a plausible plot should make clear 
the connection between each action and its successor. Psy-
chologist Jerome Bruner writes that one strategy that stories 
can employ to establish plausibility is “narrative banalization,” 
the production of a narrative so “socially conventional,” so 
“in keeping with the canon” that a reader scarcely questions 
it.31 Asylum lawyers, in their advice to those who represent 
asylum seekers, draw on both causal necessity and narrative 
banalization as tools for asserting the plausibility of a case. 
Kirsten Schlenger, an asylum attorney, implicitly invokes 
causal necessity: “By the end of the [applicant’s] declaration,” 
she writes, “the reader should feel that there is no choice but 
to grant asylum.”32 In other words, it should be clear that the 
next necessary chain in the sequence of events is the grant of 
asylum. Caplow, on the other hand, in her advice, draws on 
narrative banalization as a possible tool for making stories 
plausible: “The David and Goliath parable in modern terms 
of the brave individual struggling for freedom and democ-
racy against a vicious tyrant is often at the heart of the claim. 
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Valiant, despised groups fighting for identity and survival 
offer another familiar plot. Resistance to or suffering at the 
hands of authorities are other possible themes.”33
Asylum officers and immigration judges likely have devel-
oped expectations of how archetypal stories should end. By 
drawing on these “familiar” plots, an applicant bolsters the 
plausibility and persuasiveness of his own tale. 
The last vital criterion the applicant’s story must satisfy is 
“consistency.” True stories are certainly expected to be inter-
nally consistent, but this criterion becomes a more pressing 
concern for an applicant when he is, inevitably, asked to repeat 
his story. Most applicants will tell their stories at least two 
times, and often three: once in writing, once in an interview, 
and/or once in front of a judge. For most applicants, the writ-
ten version of the story is the most thorough and complete, 
while the interview with an asylum officer or an examination 
in front of an immigration judge is used to fact check, or to 
test the story. Dates, numbers, locations, and relationships 
are expected to stay the same through the multiple iterations 
of the claim; if they do not, an applicant will not be found 
credible. This premium on consistency is common across 
most legal proceedings. It is mimicked, like the other criteria, 
in standard expectations of literary narrators as well. Non-
fiction writer Vivian Gornick puts it succinctly when she says, 
“The narrator of a non-fiction narrative must be trustworthy 
… you must believe that I am really honest.”34 In narrative 
conventions, consistency is a foundation for trustworthiness. 
We believe that what is true should remain a fixed feature of a 
story, regardless of how many times it is told. 
Caplow’s last reminder about telling a credible story is 
that even a detailed, plausible, and consistent story ought 
be “[related] convincingly, in writing and orally,” which is 
to say that it must both satisfy formal criteria and be relayed 
articulately.35 Scarry, in her work on human pain, forcibly 
points out, “To have great pain is to have certainty; to hear 
that another person has pain is to have doubt.”36 She also 
states that a key assumption underlying anti-torture advo-
cacy work, medicine, and law is that “verbally expressing 
pain is a necessary prelude to the collective task of diminish-
ing pain.”37 Taking these together, Scarry claims (1) the more 
effective your language is in conveying your pain, the more 
effectively we are able to overcome our doubt, and (2) if you 
cannot tell us your pain, we cannot fix it. Below is an excerpt 
of a conversation between two asylum officers:
Asylum Officer 1: When I get somebody from China who I know 
is a PhD, I’m much more generous with them than I am with some 
guy who I may think is cooking in the back of some kitchen. And 
it’s not because—it’s not—that’s not how I’m thinking either. But 
I’m thinking that oh, this person is very articulate. Their claim is 
very— 
Asylum Officer 2: Well of course, it makes it easier to understand 
it.38
The conversation suggests that asylum officers are not 
immune to the language in which a claim is made and may 
carry biases against those who are less “articulate,” who relay 
their present fear or past suffering less effectively. In other 
words, asylum officers and immigration judges, like most 
people, are more able to believe the suffering of those who 
express their suffering well. 
At first glance, it may seem appropriate that the appear-
ance of truth in an asylum application resembles so closely 
the appearance of veracity in literature. One might imagine 
that true stories, regardless of the context in which they are 
told, tend to sound the same. I argue rather that this align-
ment in our legal and literary expectations is deeply prob-
lematic; though the legal system is intensely suspicious of 
storytellers, in the most pejorative sense of the word, the 
requirements of the asylum application, which so closely 
resemble the dictates of literary truth, blur the distinction 
between truth and artful storytelling.
Incredible Truths 
Review your application for asylum just so that you’re comfortable 
when you go in for your interview and you don’t get nervous about 
your facts. Because even though it’s your story sometimes under 
the circumstances … 
—Asylum lawyer to asylum applicant39
Undeniably some of the stories told in asylum applications 
are patently not true. Such applications, ones in which any 
“material elements” are “deliberately fabricated” are termed 
“frivolous.”40 For some applicants, political asylum is an alter-
native to standard immigration proceedings to which they 
may not have access. Others who arrive in the United States 
without understanding the channels to legal status and no 
English language skills may be easy prey for “preparers” who 
charge them large sums of money and file applications on 
their behalf. These “preparers” might submit a standardized 
story and provide the applicant with a script to follow.41 The 
instructions on the I-589 form, likely in recognition of this 
phenomenon, state, “You may not avoid a frivolous finding 
simply because someone advised you to provide false infor-
mation in your asylum application.”42 Others, even without 
“preparers,” may be under the impression that they “have to 
furnish horror stories” in order to compete with the stories 
others are likely to tell.43
But it would be too simple to suggest that most applica-
tions are either entirely true or entirely false. As one asylum 
officer explained, “The most skeletal application for asylum 
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could have lots of great stuff and three inches of bullshit.”44 A 
2013 article written for the New Yorker illustrated such a case: 
Caroline, whose family members were chased out of their 
homes and beaten on account of their political beliefs, told 
asylum officers she had been raped, convinced this was the 
claim more likely to win her asylum. Caroline felt she had 
to tell the story that she thought her asylum officer wanted 
to hear. According to the article, “The system demanded a 
certain kind of narrative if she was to be allowed to stay here, 
and she furnished it. She had read the expected symptoms of 
persecution, and repeated them upon command.”45 Some of 
the events in her claim were true. Others were fabricated. If 
this binary between the true and the false suffices to under-
stand Caroline’s case, it is too limited a system to understand 
all cases. 
Evaluating asylum stories for their truthfulness requires 
a greater sensitivity to gradations of reality. Anthropologist 
Marita Eastmond writes, “Narratives are not transparent 
renditions of ‘truth,’ but reflect a dynamic interplay between 
life, experience, and story.”46 Psychologist Bruner, whose 
work is important to Eastmond, outlines useful distinctions 
for grappling with the relationship between truth and com-
munication. There is “life as lived, the flow of events that 
touch on a person’s life; life as experienced, how the person 
perceives and ascribes meaning to what happens, drawing 
on previous experience and cultural repertoires; and life as 
told, how experience is framed and articulated in a particu-
lar context to a particular audience.”47
Eastmond writes, “Put simply, narrative is a form in which 
activities and events are described as having a meaningful 
and coherent order, imposing on reality a unity which it does 
not inherently possess.”48 Stories usually have beginnings, 
middles, ends, and a clear sense of direction; “life as lived” 
has no such clear-cut pattern. Bruner’s and Eastmond’s con-
cepts help establish that there is necessarily change, editing, 
shaping, and mediating in the transition from lived experi-
ence to the rendering of a story. 
Given that the application process for asylum attempts to 
reconstruct “life as lived” from “life as told,” it is necessary 
not only to recognize how great a gap lies between them, but 
also that the asylum application process’s stipulations for 
how asylum seekers must bridge that gap are not inevitable 
and can even be artificial. 
When asked for the story of their lives, applicants may 
naturally assume they may tell it the way they understand 
it, the way they want to tell it, rather than the way the asy-
lum system requires it. Many applicants simply do not know 
what the American bureaucracy wants to hear. While the 
hallmarks of credibility are clear to literary scholars and 
legal practitioners, those metrics may be unknown and 
unfamiliar to applicants. Sometimes this a matter of benign 
over-sharing; Caplow writes that often applicants tell you 
things that “may be very important to them but tangential to 
the claim.”49 In other cases, it is a matter of different cultural 
norms surrounding “true stories.” A young Iatmul man in 
New Guinea, anthropologist Eastmond writes, when asked 
to describe his life, began with birth and ended far in the 
future with his own old age; his culture did not distinguish 
between the facts of an individual’s past and the model of 
what the future would someday hold.50 A Somalian applicant 
for asylum, cited by folklorist Shumam and attorney Bohmer, 
always related the story of his persecution as a group history 
rather than an individual one.51 Commonly applicants from 
countries with less focus on calendar time tell their stories 
on what sound to American audiences like faulty timelines. 
For example, one applicant explained, “In rural Kenya, you 
don’t refer to the day by the date,” but rather by the season.52 
Shumam and Bohmer draw attention to the fact that indi-
viduals who are familiar with bureaucracies tend to have a 
more developed sense of how American officials will expect 
application stories to be presented. But those with no such 
experience are ill-prepared to put on what Shumam and 
Bohmer call the “cultural performance” the asylum process 
requires.53
Crafting the right story out of the truth can be an arduous 
task for asylum seekers. Many do not recognize at first that 
legal representation would help them craft such a story. Oth-
ers cannot afford or cannot find such representation, and the 
U.S. government, though granting asylum seekers the right 
to representation, offers no public defence or financial aid to 
indigent applicants. If a lawyer or volunteer does meet with an 
applicant for asylum to help her write a narrative, the story is 
usually compiled over the course of multiple interviews and 
many hours. In such a case, the story finally presented in the 
application is a combination of the applicant’s voice and the 
lawyer’s. In 2007, applicants with legal representation were 
three times as likely to be granted asylum (45.6 per cent of 
applicants) than those without (16.3 per cent of applicants).54 
While other factors that correlate with legal representation 
also affect such a disparity, it is surely in large part a result of 
aid during the story-telling process.
Though law and literature have settled on detail, plausibil-
ity, and consistency as indicators of “truth” in stories, there is 
little evidence to suggest that “true” asylum stories have any 
of these characteristics. The demands of a credible story are 
in many cases profoundly incompatible with the truths of 
asylum seekers. Common barriers arise as applicants, aided 
and unaided alike, try to create stories that sound credible 
to the American legal system. Many of those barriers take 
considerable effort to overcome. 
For example, research has shown that memory, especially 
of detail, is neither complete nor stable. People from all 
Volume 34 Refuge Number 2
91
cultures, in all circumstances, are quick to forget the times, 
dates, frequency, duration, and sequence of the events of 
their lives, and the consistency of memory only deteriorates 
over time.55 While considerable variation in an account 
of the past is often overlooked in informal settings, in the 
asylum setting, one inconsistency in dates has been known 
to be the difference between acceptance and rejection.56 
Preparation is useful because details can become fixed in our 
memory through “deliberate, repeated attention,” the same 
kind of conscientious memorization we use to remember 
multiplication tables.57 One asylum officer said, “It’s funny, 
sometimes the cases that are real, that aren’t fabricated, often 
have more inconsistencies. You know, usually—sometimes a 
story that’s fabricated and that’s rehearsed is gonna be tighter. 
So that’s kind of the irony of all this, you know.”58 
Unstable memory can speak not only to the effects of 
time, but also to the consequences of trauma. Asylum stories 
are often stories of trauma, or trauma narrowly escaped. But 
trauma complicates a person’s ability to tell stories about the 
past. Dori Laub, who collected testimony from multiple Hol-
ocaust survivors, asserts that “massive trauma precludes its 
registration.”59 Laub suggests than any interviewer of a sur-
vivor must respect that there exists a “subtle balance between 
what the [survivor] knew and what she did not, or could not, 
know.”60 The impulse to shy away from detail when recount-
ing one’s story, to avoid what James Wood calls details with 
“thisness,” characterized by “concretion” and “palpability,” is 
not always a reflection of a will to deceive; it may also be an 
act of self-protection, a necessary means of preventing past 
trauma from becoming concrete and palpable.61
Laub points out that while in some contexts, especially 
therapeutic ones, a listener is there to hear “what [the sur-
vivor] was there to tell,” to comprehend “life as experienced,” 
in other contexts, including the legal one, listeners take a 
radically different approach.62 Laub cites the example of a 
survivor telling the story of watching three chimneys burst 
into flame on the day of her release from a concentration 
camp. A historian comparing her account to material evi-
dence found that only one chimney had exploded. For Laub, 
a psychoanalyst, the testimony authentically reflected the 
enormity of the occurrence in the mind of the testifier.63 The 
historian, or legal adjudicator for that matter, whose concern 
is empirical accuracy, often assumes that even one “false” 
claim—one that does not align with the observable histori-
cal record—discredits the validity of all claims or indicates 
a will to deceive. The story told by the survivor may well 
have been her truth and yet simultaneously discarded by an 
external reviewer as false.64 
Applicants also experience difficulty presenting their 
claims in a manner that seems plausible to American audi-
ences. By plausible I mean coherent and believable; events 
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follow each other by “causal necessity” and fall within the 
realm of verisimilitude. By their very nature, in that they con-
tain violations of human rights, asylum stories upend com-
mon assumptions of how people will or should act and thus 
often seem unbelievable. One lawyer, the son of Holocaust 
survivors and the defender of Haitian applicants for asylum, 
noted that for each group a “recurrent refrain” when speak-
ing of their experiences was, “‘No one would ever believe 
this if they did not know it already to be true.’”65 And indeed, 
both communities have been consistently met with disbelief 
by those far removed from the conflicts narrated, including 
by immigration judges. Bruner’s term, “narrative banaliza-
tion,” the act of turning a story into one that is familiar and 
recognizable to its listener, may simply not be an option for 
those fleeing from great danger and complex political situa-
tions that they themselves may not fully understand.66 
Conclusion
The Refugee Act of 1980 acknowledged that we needed greater 
“equity” in our treatment of asylum seekers, and while it has 
brought about a considerable shift in the geographic origins 
of asylum seekers, it has not yet lived up to its goal. Instead, it 
has created a system in which, for asylum seekers, a particu-
lar kind of story is the key to the door of the United States. 
It is a key to which the bureaucratically savvy, the well rep-
resented, and those familiar with our narrative conventions 
have special access, and to which the most “tempest-tost” of 
all may have the least access. When our notions of what a 
“true story” sounds like are so profoundly influenced by what 
a good story sounds like, as defined by literary standards, we 
risk conflating the two; we risk becoming confused about 
the distinction between a true story and a story well told, 
and perhaps increasingly unlikely to believe the stories of 
those who do not express their suffering “well.” Furthermore, 
asylum applicants may be among the least able to produce 
a “true story” as the American asylum application process 
has defined it. Asylum seekers to the United States, eligible 
for asylum under the international definition, could easily 
speak their truth and fail to tell a “true story.”
Volume 34 Refuge Number 2
92
 4 United States Department of Homeland Security. U.S. Citi-
zenship and Immigration Service. I-589, Application for 
Asylum and for Withholding of Removal. 2014. 
 5 I-589 Application for Asylum and for Withholding of 
Removal, 2.
 6 I-589 Application for Asylum and for Withholding of 
Removal, 2.
 7   In short, there are two basic paths to political asylum in 
the United States: affirmative and defensive. In an affirma-
tive case, an applicant is already in the United States and 
can file an I-589 form with USCIS. He will be called in for 
an interview with a member of the Asylum Officer Corp., 
an asylum officer, in a “non-adversarial” hearing. No gov-
ernment lawyer will argue against him; instead, the asylum 
officer will solicit information and decide his case. If the 
asylum officer grants his case, he is an “asylee.” If the asy-
lum officer denies his case, the applicant is sent to immi-
gration court and his case is decided upon in a “defensive,” 
“adversarial” manner, with a government lawyer arguing 
against him and an immigration judge deciding on his case. 
If the judge rules favourably, he is an asylee. If not, he is 
deported. If an applicant requests asylum when attempting 
to enter the country, he will be put straight into defensive 
proceedings before an immigration judge. At every point 
in both processes, an applicant has the right to have repre-
sentation at no cost to the government. Many applicants do 
not have access to legal services and represent themselves. 
For a more thorough treatment of these policies and their 
multiple caveats, see Regina Germain, Asylum Primer: A 
Practical Guide to U.S. Asylum Law and Procedure (Wash-
ington, DC: American Immigration Lawyers Association, 
2010).
 8  Throughout this article, I will be using story and narrative 
synonymously. Some, including most famously, E.M. For-
ester, have made a distinction between story, a list of events 
without causality, and plot, which links events. In this case, 
I am considering stories to have plots.
 9 Aristotle, Poetics, The Internet Classics Archive, http://clas-
sics.mit.edu/Aristotle/poetics.1.1.html.
 10   Herman, “Introduction,” The Cambridge Companion to 
Narrative (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 
9.
 11  Herman, “Introduction,” 7.
 12 Stacy Caplow, “Putting the ‘I’ in Wr*t*ng: Drafting an A/
Effective Personal Statement to Tell a Winning Refugee 
Story,” Journal of the Legal Writing Institute, 14 (2008): 249.
 13 Peter Brooks and Paul D. Gewirtz, Law’s Stories: Narrative 
and Rhetoric in the Law (New Haven, CT: Yale University 
Press, 1996), 5.
 14 Well-Founded Fear, Shari Robertson and Michael Camerini, 
dir., Epidavros Project, 2000.
 15  I-589 Application for Asylum, 2.
 16 An affidavit is a “voluntary declaration of facts writ-
ten down and sworn to by the declarant before an officer 
authorized to administer oaths,” which is usually a notary 
public. A declaration is also a written statement but is not 
notarized. Applicants may submit either.
 17 See, for example, Caplow, “Putting the ‘I’ in Wr*t*ng”; 
Kristen Schlenger, “The Nuts and Bolts of Representing an 
Asylum Claim” (PLI Corp. Law and Practice Course, Hand-
book Series No. 108, October 1998); or HealTorture.org for 
examples.
 18 Caplow, “Putting the ‘I’ in Wr*t*ng,” 252.
 19 Well-Founded Fear.
 20 Caplow, “Putting the ‘I’ in Wr*t*ng,” 252.
 21 Caplow, “Putting the ‘I’ in Wr*t*ng,” 280.
 22 Caplow, “Putting the ‘I’ in Wr*t*ng,” 280–1.
 23 Well-Founded Fear.
 24  Well-Founded Fear.
 25 Roland Barthes, The Rustle of Language (New York: Hill 
and Wang, 1986), 141–2.
 26 Barthes, Rustle of Language, 148
 27 Barthes, Rustle of Language, 148.
 28 James Wood, How Fiction Works (New York: Farrar, Straus 
and Giroux, 2008), 54.
 29 Wood, How Fiction Works, 54.
 30 Aristotle, Poetics.
 31 Jerome Bruner, “The Narrative Construction of Real-
ity,” Critical Inquiry 18, no. 1 (1991): 9.
 32 Schlenger, “Nuts and Bolts of Representing an Asylum 
Applicant,” 8.
 33 Caplow, “Putting the ‘I’ in Wr*t*ng,” 286.
 34 Vivian Gornick, “The Reliable Reporter and the Untrust-
worthy Narrator.” Soundings: An Interdisciplinary Journal 
76, no. 2/3 (1993): 280.
 35 Caplow, “Putting the ‘I’ in Wr*t*ng,” 286.
 36 Elaine Scarry, The Body in Pain: The Making and Unmaking 
of the World (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), 49.
 37 Scarry, Body in Pain, 9.
 38 Well-Founded Fear.
 39 Well-Founded Fear.
 40 I-589, Application for Asylum or Withholding of Removal, 
2. USCIS does not publish statistics on the number of “frivo-
lous” findings.
 41 Well-Founded Fear.
 42 I-589, Application for Asylum or Withholding of Removal.
 43 Suketu Mehta, “The Asylum Seeker,” New Yorker, 1 August 
2011, http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2011/08/01/
the-asylum-seeker.
 44 Well-Founded Fear.
 45 Mehta, “Asylum Seeker.”
 46 Marita Eastmond. “Stories as Lived Experience: Narratives 
in Forced Migration Research,” Journal of Refugee Studies 
20, no. 2 (2007): 249.
 47 Eastmond, “Stories as Lived Experience,” 249.
 48 Eastmond, “Stories as Lived Experience,” 250.
 49 Caplow, “Putting the ‘I’ in Wr*t*ng,” 272.
 50 Eastmond, “Narrative as Lived Experience,” 252.
Volume 34 Refuge Number 2
93
 51 Amy Shuman and Carol Bohmer, “Representing Trauma: 
Political Asylum Narrative,” Journal of American Folklore 
117, no. 466 (2004): 410.
 52 David Ngaruri Kenney and Philip G. Schrag, Asylum 
Denied: A Refugee’s Struggle for Safety in America (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2008), 118.
 53 Shumam and Bohmer, “Representing Trauma,” 410.
 54 Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Andrew I. Schoenholtz, and Phillip G. 
Schrag, “Refugee Roulette: Disparities in Asylum Adjudi-
cation,” Stanford Law Review 60, no. 2 (2007): 341.
 55 H.E. Cameron, “Refugee Status Determinations and the 
Limits of Memory,” International Journal of Refugee Law 22, 
no. 4 (2010): 470.
 56 Cameron, “Refugee Status Determinations,” 472.
 57 Cameron, “Refugee Status Determinations,” 472.
 58 Well-Founded Fear.
 59 Shoshana Felman and Dori Laub, Testimony: Crises of 
Witnessing in Literature, Psychoanalysis, and History (New 
York: Routledge, 1991), 58.
 60 Felman and Laub, Testimony, 58.
 61 Wood, How Fiction Works, 9.
 62 Felman and Laub, Testimony, 62–3.
 63 Felman and Laub, Testimony, 63.
 64 Another important component to consider with the appli-
cations of trauma survivors is that in order to be successful 
applicants, they must frame their story as politically moti-
vated. Even if they understood what happened to them as 
a personal attack, to make their claim eligible, it must be 
told as part of a larger political disruption. Shumam and 
Bohmer claim that this is a requirement closely related to 
Western historical examples of dissent and persecution, 
and not easily comprehensible to those from other histori-
cal and political traditions.
 65 Peter Margulies, “Difference and Distrust in Asylum Law: 
Haitian and Holocaust Refugee Narratives.” Saint Thomas 
Law Review 6 (1993): 135.
 66 Bruner, “Narrative Construction of Reality,” 9.
Madeline Holland is the deputy executive director at Talent 
beyond Boundaries. The author may be contacted at  
madelineholland@post.harvard.edu.
